Some of the most important choices faced by a firm considering going public concern the structure of the firm's governance and monitoring mechanisms. These decisions influence the initial valuation of the firm, its long-term operating performance, and the investment decisions of institutional investors. We examine varying governance mechanisms in place at the time of a firm's initial public offering. Our sample consists of over 200 Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) over the time period 1991 to 1998. We use REITs in our study for several reasons: (1) The relatively transparent nature of REITs (compared to industrial firms) mitigates information asymmetry about the types of projects the firms undertake. (2) By focusing on one industry, we reduce the effects of varying asset risk and predictability. (3) REITs exhibit substantial heterogeneity in governance structures, and in pre-IPO history (for example, our sample includes REIT IPOs of new organizations, former limited partnerships, former private firms or private REITs). (4) The legal restrictions that all REITs must adhere to lessen the degree of managerial control relative to the standard corporation. Our analysis indicates that REIT governance structure at the time of the IPO, and their pre-IPO history are important determinants of their initial value and future operating performance. Specifically, we find that REITS with stronger governance structures not only have higher initial IPO valuations (based on Tobin's Q) but also outperform their peers in terms of long-term operating performance. We also show that a firm's corporate governance structure influences the amount of institutional ownership.
Introduction
The separation of ownership and control of the firm provides much of the impetus for corporate governance. To mitigate shareholder-manager conflicts, many control mechanisms have been devised, including compensation contracts, board design, antitakeover amendments, ownership structure, takeovers, and the use of leverage.
1 There has been continuing debate on the effect of these choices on valuation and operating performance. For example, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) find that as managerial ownership increases, the market value of the firm (using Tobin's Q as their proxy) first increases, due to incentive alignment, and then declines signaling management entrenchment or non-value-maximizing behavior. However, recent studies have debated the role of endogeneity in their analysis (Hubbard, Himmelberg, and Palia (1999) , Zhou (2001)). Consequently, controversy remains on the relation between managerial ownership and the market value of the firm using Tobin's Q.
Other researchers have found that using other control mechanisms might also affect firm value. Yermack (1996) provides evidence that smaller boards are associated with higher valuations and greater performance (i.e., higher Q). Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) find that, although a public announcement of anti-takeover amendments has an insignificant wealth effect, the more negative responses are associated with higher insider and lower institutional holdings. Fueling the debate further, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) show that, since the alternative control mechanisms are interdependent, the impact of a single control mechanism on firm performance (measured by Tobin's Q) is probably misleading.
The purpose of our study is to examine how differences in the corporate governance structure of a firm at the time of its IPO affect its initial stock market valuation and long-term operating (accounting) performance. We also study whether a firm's governance structure influences institutional ownership. We use Tobin's Q as our proxy for initial stock market valuation, which mitigates the need for risk adjustment (see Lang and Stultz (1994) ).
From an agency perspective, we would expect that investors would pay less for a stock, the lower the quality of a firm's corporate governance (agency hypothesis). Lower value could arise either from lower expected cash flows because investors expect management to divert a portion of the profits (or invest suboptimally due to private benefits), or from higher (priced) risk.
Thus, higher agency costs (less strong corporate governance) should translate into lower market valuations By focusing on IPOs, we are able to examine the role of governance at the beginning of the firm's life as a public corporation. A potentially important implication is that any negative valuation effects are borne by insiders through the offering's proceeds. Thus, a negative relation between the strength of corporate governance and firm valuation at the time of the IPO is consistent with insiders' willingness to trade looser monitoring of their activities for cash. In this way, we are able to estimate a value of agency costs to firm insiders.
Prior studies of the relation between corporate governance and IPOs, such as Frye (2002) , have focused on how and why the governance structure changes following an IPO. Although prior studies have also shown that large investors can and do exert control rights, the use of concentrated ownership as a governance mechanism does not explain why concentrated (e.g., institutional) ownership arises. We posit that institutional ownership increases the higher the quality of a firm's governance structure in order to lessen their cost of monitoring the firm's management (the monitoring hypothesis).
To address those issues, we use real estate investment trusts (REITs) due to their rich array of corporate governance structures, coupled with their legal restrictions that curb certain types of management behavior and lessen the effectiveness of certain corporate control devices. Using
REITs has other advantages. The relatively transparent nature of REITs (compared to industrial firms) mitigates information asymmetry about the types of projects the firms undertake. Further, by focusing on one industry, we reduce the effects of varying asset risk and predictability.
In looking at REITs, we examine the type of management that the firm initial chooses, the variety of compensation contracts associated with each management structure, and the extent to which the resulting management contract aligns the interests of management with shareholders.
There are two basic REIT management structures: internal management, where managers are salaried employees of the firm, and external/advisor management, where the REIT has no employees and managers are employees of the outside advisory firm. Managers of advisor REITs are frequently allowed to set up independent companies to either buy or sell assets as well as goods and services to the REIT, thus increasing the opportunities for managerial expropriation of funds and self-dealing. If the REIT chooses internal management, the compensation contract is similar to that of a regular corporation. If the REIT is externally advised, several types of compensation contracts exist. These include contracts based on cash flows from operation, and those in which compensation is not tied to operational results, but based on assets.
We therefore expect that the REIT's choice of management style affects initial valuation.
More specifically, we posit that internally managed REITs should have a higher Tobin's Q relative to advisor REITs, due to the greater alignment of management and shareholder interests (management style hypothesis). Because this incentive alignment is likely to affect cash flows, we would also expect a higher level of long-term operating performance for self-advised relative to adviser REITs.
Since the compensation contract and other corporate control mechanisms appear to vary with the management structure chosen, the choice of management structure might empirically dominate the impact of various alternative control devices. However, consistent with the prior literature, we would expect higher Q's to correspond to larger proportions of variable compensation and smaller percentages of compensation to total revenue ( compensation hypothesis). All else equal, investors should prefer lower compensation expense and greater payfor-performance sensitivity.
In addition to agency considerations, another dimension to consider and control for in examining "initial" corporate governance is the "newness" of the firm, as some IPOs involve existing private firms going public. Whether an existing firm exhibits a higher Q depends in part on its prior type. For example, if the firm was originally a limited partnership, we would expect a lower Q (IPO performance) given their prior history. 2 In contrast, if the firm was a developer who 2 Many RELPs changed their organizational structure to either REITs or publicly traded partnerships after the passage of the 1986 Tax Reform Act. With few exceptions, these RELPs had poor governance structures together chooses to go public simply to access more capital or a spin-off of a profitable company, a higher Q should obtain on average (Track record hypothesis).
Our analysis indicates that REIT governance structure at the time of the IPO, and their pre-IPO history are i mportant determinants of initial value and future operating performance.
Specifically, we find that REITS with stronger governance structures not only have higher initial IPO valuations (Tobin's Q), but also outperform their peers in terms of long-term operating performance. We further find that institutional investors appear to take a firm's corporate governance structure into account in selecting in which IPO firms to invest.
While our study is not the first to examine the performance of REITs relative to their organizational form and agency costs, prior studies have focused exclusively on how an existing REIT's organizational form is related to its long-term stock market performance rather than its initial structure-value relationship.
3 Howe and Shilling (1990) document the underperformance of externally managed REITs relative to internally managed REITs. Hsieh and Sirmans (1991) find that this underperformance arises in part from tie-in relationships with external advisors. Cannon and Vogt (1995) demonstrate that this underperformance persists for externally managed REITs, even after adjusting for differences in market risk. Capozza and Seguin (2000) find that underperformance of externally managed REITs stems management compensation contracts for advisor REITs, which create incentives to issue more debt in order to increase their compensation base. They find that these debt contracts are negotiated at above-market rates. They also demonstrate that this underperformance is only partially anticipated by shareholders.
Although some prior REIT studies have examined the influence of corporate control mechanisms on performance, these studies do not consider the impact of management style (external versus internal) on performance nor IPO performance. 4 While our study is also not the with unsatisfactory operating performance and low payouts. Prior to 1986, Rogers and Owers (1985) and Kapplin and Schwartz (1986) find that RELPs tend to underperform institutional properties. Kallberg and Liu (1995) find that the sponsor is one of the most important determinants of RELP performance. 3 The implicit assumption underlying many of these studies is that the stock market is inefficient. In an efficient market, once an IPO is publicly traded, the should reflect the shares' intrinsic value. Risk-adjusted, post-IPO stock price performance should not be predictable. 4 Solt and Miller (1985) and Golec (1994) find that financial performance based on operating results is positively related to compensation contracts. A limitation of both studies is that all REITs examined were externally advised and thus the authors cannot consider the impact of management style on performance. Damodaran and Liu (1993) show that changes in insider ownership affect the stock performance of REITs through signaling private first to investigate the performance of REIT IPOs, 5 our focus on whether the initial corporate governance structure offers a partial explanation for why institutional investors invest more heavily in some IPOs is novel. Our use of Tobin's Q as the performance metric also distinguishes us from prior studies.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of REITs along with including management types, differences in compensation contracts, and the associated corporate control problems. Section 3 describes the sample. Section 4 reports our findings on the impact of management styles and compensation contracts on the initial value of an IPO's (Tobin's Q).
Section 5 concludes.
REITs and their Corporate Governance Structure

Characteristics
Due to REIT legal requirements, the amount of manager discretion wielded by REIT managers is significantly less than in regular corporations. These requirements are as follows: § Insider ownership of stock, the 5-50 rule: In contrast to a regular corporation, the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) restricts the five largest shareholders of a REIT to controlling (directly or indirectly) no more than 50 percent of the REIT's shares. Institutional holdings are not regarded as a single investor for purposes of this rule. 6 As such, many REITs have a provision in their articles of incorporation that permits five persons to acquire up to a maximum of 9.8% each, or an aggregate of 49% of the outstanding common stock. Due partly to this restriction, REIT insiders and in particular, the trustees and advisors typically own only a minimal amount, if any, REIT shares. In our REIT sample, the median insider ownership was 9.5% of information. Damodaran, John, and Liu (1997) find that a change in organizational form affects performance. None of the studies investigate return performance at the time of, or a year after, the REIT IPO.
5 Wang, Chan and Gau (1992) , for the 1971-1988 period, find that REIT IPOs suffer a price decline on the first day of trading and in the subsequent four months. They attribute this result to the inapplicability of the adverse selection/winner's curse theories given the scarcity of institutional investors in REIT IPOs over their study period. Ling and Ryngaert (1997) , from 1991 to 1994, find that REIT IPOs are underpriced. They relate this finding to greater institutional investor participation in the REIT IPO market over time. 6 Prior to 1993, each institutional investor was regarded as a single stockholder with respect to the 5-50 rule. The 1993 tax law created a "look-through" provision that permitted institutional holdings to be allocated among their beneficiaries. A consequence of this prior ruling was that institutional holdings were relatively small and that institutions played a limited role prior to 1993.
the outstanding common stock (13.6% mean) at the IPO. This amount decreased to 7.5%
(median, 12.4% mean) a year after the IPO. The 5-50 rule was originally designed to diffuse ownership and to prevent management from expropriating wealth from small shareholders.
Consequently, we expect initial value (Q ratio) to increase as management increases their ownership in the firm in accordance with the agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) (ownership hypothesis). § 95% Dividend payout requirement: To qualify as a REIT, a company must distribute at least 95 percent of its taxable income excluding net capital gains as dividends. Since managers of REITs have less discretion over their cash flows relative to regular corporations (see Jensen (1986) ), this payout requirement tends to mitigate agency problems. This restricts a REIT's ability to fund growth internally through retained earnings. Wang, Erickson, and Gau (1993) find that REITs generally pay out more than 95% of their taxable income as dividends. As a result, REITs must continually raise capital through seasoned debt or equity offerings while expending free cash flow through a high dividend payout. The market for secondary equity offers thus acts as a monitoring mechanism. § REITs are exempt from investment company status: Although a REIT resembles an investment company, most REITs are exempt from "investment company" status as defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940 through the provision in section 3(c)(5)(C)
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. As such, a REIT is not subject to the same corporate governance provisions and the structure of its investment advisory contract as an investment company. § Restrictions on investments: The tax code requires that a minimum of 75% of a REIT's gross income must come from real estate. A REIT is further restricted to be a passive investment conduit; as such, less than 30% of a REIT's income must come from the operation of real estate held less than 4 years and income from the sale of securities held less than 1 year. REITs also cannot engage in active real estate operations, including operating a business, developing or trading properties for sale, and selling more than five properties per year. A REIT is further prohibited from entering into tax-free exchanges to acquire properties.
If these provisions are met, then a REIT is not taxed on its distributed taxable income; Income is taxed only at the shareholder level. However, the trust is prohibited from passing through any operating losses to shareholders as a tax credit. Other than these conditions, the organizational structure of a REIT is the same as an ordinary corporation.
The relative homogeneity across REITs mitigates many of the concerns present in the extant governance literature using Tobin's Q as the performance metric. One concern is that Q proxies for growth opportunities, which makes it difficult to interpret some of the literature's findings.
However, at any point in time, REITs generally face similar growth opportunities, given the legal restrictions that are applicable to all REITs.
Management of the REIT: Externally Advised or Self-Administered
Corporate governance problems can also arise from a REIT's choice of management structure. REITs are organized either as advisor REITs or as self-advised REITs. In an advisor REIT, the advisory firm (an entity distinct from the REIT) is responsible for managing the daily operations of the REIT and presenting investment opportunities to the board of directors of the REIT. There are no restrictions on who may act as a REIT adviser. Officers of the company that organized (sponsored) the REIT generally serve as officers of both the sponsor and the advisory firm. The advisor is compensated according to an advisory contract that is typically renewed annually at the discretion of the REIT's board of directors. Reasons given for selecting externally advised management usually involve taking advantage of the existing operational systems, expertise and economies of scale associated with the manager's current business operations.
Another reason is that the REIT might benefit from management that is experienced in the market for debt or equity real estate and that has existing relationships in that market. In contrast, the management of self-advised REITs is similar to that of a typical corporation. All managers are employees of the REIT.
Prior to 1991, all REITs were externally advised at the time of their IPO. While selfadvised REITs appeared as early as 1986 as the result of private letter rulings from the IRS, 8 it was Kimco Realty's IPO in 1991 that marked the start of REITs that were initially self-advised.
While most REITs subsequent to 1990 elected self-advised management at the time of their IPO, some REITs opted for external advisors, particularly mortgage REITs. In our sample, 80% of the REITs since 1991 were self-advised at the time of their initial public offering.
Greater potential for conflicts of interest exists for advisor REITs relative to selfadministered REITs. 9 The potential for conflict is especially pronounced when the interests of the sponsor vis-à-vis the REIT advisory firm differ from that of the REIT's stockholders, such as when competition for the same investment opportunities arises between the adviser and the REIT. An example is when a REIT is formed as a captive financing affiliate of its sponsor. 10 A captive REIT differs in that, at least at the outset, all of its properties (mortgages) are obtained from a sponsoring company (the company that started the REIT), which uses the REIT as a financing mechanism to raise either equity and/or debt capital. For example, a health care company may sponsor a REIT for the expressed purpose of purchasing all of its properties and then leasing back the properties to the health care company. To ensure that this business relationship continues, the sponsoring company typically sets up a subsidiary company that acts as the advisor to the REIT. Most captive REITs share managers, boards of directors and their chief executive with the sponsoring company, which leads to conflicts of interest (e.g., the sponsor might to veto a potential acquisition that might benefit the trust).
The nature of the contractual relationship could thus promote self-dealing. For example, the advisor or its affiliates could receive financial terms or non-price concessions such as longer loan periods or higher loan-to-value ratios from the REIT than are available elsewhere. Since the captive REIT also lends itself to the sponsor generating business for its advisory affiliates through tie-in arrangements, a moral hazard problem could occur. 
Classes of REIT Investors: One Group or Two
A new modification in the ownership structure of REITs is the umbrella partnership REIT (UPREIT). Both self-administered and advisor REITs can have an UPREIT structure. The UPREIT structure has a tax benefit over traditional REITs in acquiring properties. In particular, holders of existing properties are given partnership shares in the REIT rather than REIT shares.
Partnership shares are not taxed until they are converted to REIT shares. However, a disadvantage of the UPREIT is that it has the potential for greater conflicts of interest because the UPREIT structure creates two distinct g roups of owners: holders of partnership shares and the REIT shareholders. The interests of these two shareholder groups can differ, for example when new shareholders wish to sell properties acquired vis-à-vis partnership shares. A sale triggers capital gains taxes for shareholders of these partnership shares. Holders of operating partnership units can convert their units into common shares, although this conversion triggers a taxable event.
UPREITs comprise approximately 43% of our sample (84 REITs). The overwhelming majority of the UPREITs (92% or 77 REITs) are also self-administered, but this is not surprising given the trend since 1991 to use a self-administered management structure.
Compensation Arrangements
In addition to these potential conflicts, conflicts can also occur in the compensation arrangements of the advisor for managing the REIT. Compensation agreements are important; management fees represent the single largest expense item in some REIT's income statement (other than interest expense). Three general types of compensation arrangements exist for REITs. These arrangements include compensation that is either independent of operating performance, based on cash flows, performance based, or a combination thereof. 12 Jenkins (1980) and Capozza and Seguin (2000) show that the type of compensation arrangement used can create a moral hazard 12 In the first arrangement, compensation is independent of a REIT's operational performance. This payment arrangement includes compensation based either on a percentage of assets, a percentage of equity, or a fixed fee. The second classification involves compensation based on a percentage of REIT income, either gross (revenue) or net cash flow (FFO). This income might include net capital gains on the sale of property. This type of symmetric compensation arrangement does a better job at aligning management interests with shareholder interests. The third category of compensation involves payment to the adviser based on a REIT's operational results, typically a participation in net income or cash flow when it exceeds some minimum level, in addition to a fixed fee.
problem in which a manager increases the portion of debt in a firm's capital structure to increase his compensation. 13 As such, we consider a REIT's capital structure (debt/equity ratio) in examining the relation between a REIT's corporate governance structure and its IPO performance.
Management could also receive additional income for tie-in business arrangements as in the case of captive REITs. 
Sample design and data
We assembled a list of all REITs using five sources: various editions of the National With these data, we construct our primary measure of stock-market-valuation, Tobin's Q, denoted Q IPO . Q IPO is defined as [(IPO offer price * shares outstanding) + (total assets -book equity)] / total assets, where shares outstanding, total assets are book equity are taken from the first available post-IPO quarter on Compustat. 16 We also calculate an adjusted Q, Q IPO,A , by subtracting the difference between Q IPO and the median Q for all seasoned REITs (i.e., REITs that have been public for greater than one year) as of that calendar quarter. While we recognize that two primary interpretations of Q exist in the corporate finance literature: as a measure of valuation or performance, and a proxy for growth opportunities. We use the former interpretation; given the homogeneous nature of growth opportunities for REITs at any point in time, we believe that the latter interpretation is minor here (especially once adjusted by the median for all REITs). We also calculate the market capitalization based on the IPO offer price, MktCap, the amount of the IPO, IPOAmt, and a market-based leverage measure, MktLev, equal to the ratio of total debt (book value) to the sum of the market value of equity (using the offer price) and total debt.
We calculate adjusted returns, AdjRet t , as the holding-period return over t trading days less the return over the same period on a value-weighted index of seasoned REITs. We calculate three such measures for the return on the IPO day (AdjRet 0 ), and the returns over roughly the first year and two years, respectively (AdjRet 250 and AdjRet 500 ). Table 1 Monitor databases. 17 We include the common shares outstanding held by directors and executive officers as a group, in addition to shares that the REIT advisor holds (if the REIT is externally advised). We also construct the percentage of shares held by institutions at the end of the quarter in which the offering occurred, InstlOwn, using the CDA/Spectrum Institutional Holdings database of firms filing form 13-f.
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We construct indicators for self-administered REITs, SelfAdmin, and captive financing affiliates, Captive, using information primarily from the S11 registration statements (prospectus) and the proxy statements. We ascertain the level of management fees by taking the total dollar management compensation and individual compensation components taken from the annual report and the 10K, which we scale by revenues to construct Comp/Revenues. As a proxy for the degree of pay which is incentive-based, we construct VarPay, which for adviser REITs equals Incentive Fees / Total Fees, and for self-administered REITs equals (Total self-admin pay -salary -other benefits) / Total self-admin pay.
We construct several indicator variables based on the background, structure, and type of REIT. These include dummies for Umbrella Limited Partnership REITs (UPREIT), the primary property type in the REIT portfolio -Retail, Office, Industrial, Mortgage and Apt (for apartment), and the type of sponsor (Dev for developers, Synd for syndicators). In addition, we construct indicators for REITs with no prior operating history as a private company (New), for REITs that were formerly real estate limited partnerships (RELP), and for spinoffs (Spinoff). Finally, for advisor REITs, we construct TieIns, which equals the number of tie in relationships disclosed (as well as an indicator for REITs with multiple tie ins (MultTieIn). 17 The Insider Trading Monitor database contains the transaction details of all insider trading filings (ownership changes) received by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) since January 1984. The ownership of securities by over 100,000 officers, directors, and major shareholders (10% or more) in over 8,500 U.S. public companies is covered in the file. The Insider Trading Monitor covers all securities transactions by officers, directors, and major shareholders filed with the Securities & Exchange Commission as required under the Securities Act of 1934. Table 1 shows the distribution of our sample of 135 IPOs over the period 1991 to 1998. Our data are drawn from the 1990s due to the REIT structural changes discussed previously, most importantly, the fact that all REITs prior to 1990 were not self-administered. The float on most of these REITs also made it infeasible for institutional investors to take major positions in them.
Results
Almost all of our IPO sample comes from one of two clusters; 79 occurred in the period 1993 to 1994. During that 2-year period the average Tobin's Q measure (based on the offer price and the book value of total assets) is the highest over our sample period; its unadjusted values are 1.414 and 1.266 respectively. The second IPO cluster consists of 36 in the final two years of our sample.
The average adjusted Tobin's Q (Q net of the average Q for seasoned REITs) is -0.21 in this cluster. In general, the average Tobin's Q declines after 1993, becoming negative in the last 3 years of our sample period. The initial day abnormal returns are positive in each year (except in 1991, which has only 2 IPOs). Table 2 presents summary statistics for the pooled sample. The average REIT IPO in our sample has an unadjusted (adjusted) Q of 1.223 (0.106) on its IPO date. The average adjusted returns are positive, both on the initial day of trading as well as in the long run. The initial day underpricing averages 3.7%, and is consistent with the findings of Ling and Ryngaert (1977) . We find that the average one-year (two-year) abnormal return is 1.5% (2.7%). This persistence of positive returns in the long run is in contrast to the previous IPO literature (see, for example, Ibbotson and Ritter (1995) ). The median insider holding percentage is 16.7%, which is high relative to regular C-corporations. The average amount of capital raised in this IPO sample is $167 million. The average leverage is moderate, 37% of total market capitalization. Table 2 also presents summary data on compensation. The average amount of compensation that is variable (VarPay) is 22.0%; the average ratio of compensation expense to revenues (Comp/Revenues) is 3.4%. These variables will play an important role in our incentive/compensation hypotheses. The majority of our IPOs (61%) are UPREITs.
The estimated correlations of the variables described in Table 2 , together with their accompanying P-values in parentheses, are shown in Table 3 . The correlations generally support our compensation hypotheses. We see that all of our performance measurements (Q values and abnormal holding period returns) are negatively correlated with total compensation. Conversely, all of these measures are positively correlated with the amount of variable compensation. The table also shows that performance is positively correlated with initial institutional holdings.
Leverage is weakly negatively correlated with performance; there also appear to be positive economies of scale.
To extend the findings of Table 3, in Table 4 we regress the adjusted Tobin's Q against REIT type (Panel A) and against governance variables (Panel B). The only statistically significant REIT type is mortgage REITs, which have lower average Qs. This is not surprising given that most of our mortgages REITs are managed by outside advisors. In addition, the clustering of IPOs impacts the adjusted Q. Consistent with Table 1 , the first cluster is associated with high value firms, while the second cluster corresponds to relatively low value firms. Panel B of Table 4 examines whether governance variables influence firm value. The only difference in the two rows in Panel B is the inclusion of the mortgage dummy in the second row, given its significance it Panel A. The salient point is that governance does matter. Firms with a better governance structure, e.g., self-administered REITs, have higher valuations even after controlling for the influence of mortgage type and impact of IPO clusters. This is consistent with our agency hypothesis.
Since governance and value appear to be linked, we next investigate self-administered and advisor REITs separately to try to explain valuation within and across those two groups. Within each group, we define high value firms as those with adjusted Q above the group's median. A comparison of the means for both groups in Panel A of Table 5 yields a picture similar to Table 4 .
Particularly striking is the difference in long-term performance of advisor REITs; the high value firms have one-and two-period abnormal holding period returns that are 19.3% and 39.2% higher than low value firms. The corresponding differences for self-administered REITs are only 2.6% and 1.5% respectively. On average, for both advisor and self-administered REITs, high value firms have lower fees, more variable pay, greater insider ownership, and greater institutional ownership. The signs of these variables are consistent with our economic intuition, although not all are significant. In Panel B of Table 5 , we test three pairs of groups using two types of tests: t-tests for differences in means and nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. With respect to high versus low value REITs, the results echo those in Panel A above. The statistically significant differences are that high value firms have lower fees, higher insider ownership and larger market capitalizations. In terms of the statistically significant differences between self-administered and advisor REITs, self-administered REITs have better initial-day and first-year performance; have lower fees, and more variable pay (better incentives). Internally managed REITs also have higher institutional holdings relative to advisor REITs. However, there is no significant difference in institutional holdings between high and low value firms. Once again, this evidence tends to support the monitoring hypothesis. It is important to note that management style, while important, is not the only driver of our results. When looking at the differences between high and low value firms in the self-administered subset of REITs, we find that high value firms have lower fees, higher institutional holding and larger market capitalizations. Table 6 examines high and low value firms in terms of REIT structure. Over the full sample, the statistically significant differences are as follows: high value REITs are less likely to be new firms, more likely to be formed by a developer, more likely to be an UPREIT and less likely to be a spinoff. The general characteristics hold as well when examining only the self-administered
REITs. The fact that higher valued firms tend to be developers and UPREITs is consistent with the prior literature. The tax advantages associated with property acquisitions appear to dominate any conflicts of interests for UPREITs. Table 7 investigates if management style can explain differences in operating performance.
The table shows that advisor REITs exhibit poorer operating performance relative to internally managed REITs, regardless of whether performance is measured from a firm perspective or from a stockholder standpoint. The abnormal return on market (book) equity is 0.4% (1.4%) higher for self-administered REITs; the abnormal EBITDA over assets is 0.8% higher for self-administered REITS. These differences are statistically significant using both the t-test and the Wilcoxon ranksum test. Complementing this analysis, we also examine the impact of governance variables on long-run operating performance from a shareholder perspective. Consistent with our economic intuition, Table 8 reveals, that regardless of whether return on equity (ROE) is measured in terms of market value or book value, ROE for self-administered REITs increases with an increase in insider ownership and variable pay, and with a decrease in total managerial compensation as a percentage of revenue. When a REIT initially came to market does not impact operating performance. Interestingly, our governance variables do not have any statistically significant impact on the operating performance of advisor REITs. The only determinant of operating performance for this group is its initial IPO value (adjusted Q ratio) and whether it was part of a clustering of IPOs. The higher an adviser REITs initial value (adjusted Q), the higher an advisor REIT's subsequent operating performance. There is conflicting evidence on the impact that the Q associated with a self-advised REIT IPO has on subsequent operating performance. A higher Q results in a lower ROE measured in terms of market equity, but in a higher ROE if book equity is used. In contrast to self-administered REITs, when an advisor REIT initially came to market has an impact on operating performance. There is some indication that advisor REITs were of better quality when there was a clustering of IPOs.
Conclusions
The structure of a firm's governance and monitoring mechanisms are among the important decisions that a firm faces when going public. T hese choices influence firm valuation, performance, and the investment decisions of institutional investors. We examine varying governance and compensation mechanisms in place at the time of a firm's initial public offering.
Our sample consists of 135 Real Estate Investment Trusts over the time period 1991 to 1998. We use REITS in our study given the relatively transparent nature of REITs compared to industrial firms, which mitigates information asymmetry about the types of projects the firms undertake.
REITs also exhibit substantial heterogeneity in governance structures, and in pre-IPO backgrounds.
By focusing on one industry, we reduce the effects of varying asset risk and predictability. Our analysis indicates that REIT governance structure and management compensation at the time of the IPO, and their pre-IPO history are important determinants of their initial value and performance.
We find that REITS with stronger governance structures not only have higher Tobin's Q on average but also outperform their peers. Specifically, we find that higher initial values and operating performance are associated with lower fees (total compensation/revenues), more variable compensation, and greater insider ownership. We also show that a firm's corporate governance structure influences the amount of institutional ownership. "The Advisor is also permitted to earn miscellaneous compensation which may include, without limitation, construction fees, escrow interest, property management fees, leasing commissions and insurance brokerage fees. The payment of any such compensation is generally limited to the competitive rate for the services being performed.
The Advisor may engage in other business activities related to real estate, mortgage investments or other investments whether similar or dissimilar to those made by Aegis, or act as manager to any other person or entity having investment policies whether similar or dissimilar to those of Aegis. Before the Advisor, the officers and directors of the Advisor and all persons controlled by the Advisor and its officers and directors may take advantage of an opportunity for their own account or present or recommend it to others, they are obligated to present such investment opportunity to Aegis if (i) such opportunity is of a character which could be taken by Aegis, (ii) such opportunity is compatible with Aegis' investment objectives and policies and (iii)
Aegis has the financial resources to take advantage of such opportunity.
The Articles and the Advisory Agreement provide that Aegis will indemnify the Advisor and its affiliates under certain circumstances.
The Advisor is entitled to subcontract its obligations under the Advisory Agreement to an affiliate. In accordance with the foregoing, the Advisor has assigned its rights and obligations to 
